By Alfred Schutz (auth.), Lester Embree (eds.)
This quantity starts off with Schutz's caricature of ways Husserl inspired him. It indicates how phenomenological idea of the social sciences differs from positivistic ways, and provides Schutz's idea of relevances--a key characteristic of his personal phenomenology of the social global. It comprises exchanges among Schutz and Eric Voegelin, Felix Kaufmann, Aron Gurwitsch, and Talcott Parsons, and provides, for the 1st time, Schutz's incisive criticisms of T.S. Eliot's idea of tradition.
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Extra info for Collected Papers V. Phenomenology and the Social Sciences
These are systems of planning and projecting, of goals to be attained, of happiness to be realized, of duties to be performed, of evils to be warded off. They determine the scope of all the actor’s possible activities, as well as the procedure for each of his concrete acts, even the humblest ones. ” These systems again are based on systems of subjectively consistent because motives, such as principles, maxims, etc. A very important question is certainly: how may such systems emerge within the stream of an individual’s life and how do they become organized?
Within the frame of reference of a theory of motives the question can never arise as to whether ultimate values do or do not exist for the actor, but only as to what is, for the actor, the degree 1 Parsons’ Theory of Social Action 25 of relevance of the different ends and in-order-to motives. The system of motives is for the actor a given one only at a certain given moment of his existence. It necessarily changes by the pure transition of inner time, from one moment to the other, if for no other reason than that in and by this transition new experiences emerge, further ones enter the foreground of interest, whereas still others fade into the background of attention, or are entirely forgotten.
Values or norms, if they are relevant for the actor (as “Werthaltungen” or as “Normorientierungen”) find their place within the scheme as well as do all non-normative elements. Furthermore, all that is subjective in the means-end relation, in the problem of rationality, of habit, of action in conformity with a pattern, etc. enters without difficulty into this scheme. And it can be shown that all the normative values Parsons has analyzed in discussing the work of the four sociologists under consideration (Durkheim’s theory of suicide and of ritual; Marshall’s economic categories as well as Pareto’s residues and derivations; but certainly the whole work of Max Weber) are interpretable as systems of in-order-to or because motives, to the extent that the subjective point of view of all these phenomena is retained.