By J. Aaron Simmons
Contemporary discussions within the philosophy of faith, ethics, and private political philosophy were deeply marked by means of the effect of 2 philosophers who're frequently regarded as towards one another, S?ren Kierkegaard and Emmanuel Levinas. dedicated expressly to the connection among Levinas and Kierkegaard, this quantity units forth a extra rigorous comparability and sustained engagement among them. proven and more recent students representing diversified philosophical traditions convey those thinkers into discussion in 12 gleaming essays. they give thought to similarities and alterations in how each one elaborated a special philosophy of faith, they usually current subject matters comparable to time, legal responsibility, love, politics, God, transcendence, and subjectivity. This dialog among friends is sure to encourage extra inquiry and ignite philosophical debate.
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Extra info for Kierkegaard and Levinas: Ethics, Politics, and Religion (Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion)
Far from seeking to minimize the horror religiosus (FT, 61) of the situation, Silentio insists on it with a rhetoric that makes Levinas uneasy and tells us, “I have seen the terrifying face to face” (FT, 33). ” Silentio adds, “This is a hard saying. ” (FT, 72). In the text it is clear that the ethic which is to be teleologically suspended in faith is the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, the laws and customs of one’s people. Against Hegel and a complacent Christendom that finds in him an ideological spokesman, Silentio insists that the will of God is not necessarily identical with the laws and customs of any people but is, for faith, a higher norm which relativizes the latter whenever there is a conflict between what “we” think is right and what God says is right.
Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995), 151–60; Westphal, “Commanded Love and Divine Transcendence in Kierkegaard and Levinas,” in The Face of the Other and the Trace of God, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 200–33; Westphal, “Divine Excess: The God Who Comes After,” in The Religious, ed. John D. Caputo (London: Blackwell, 2002), 258–76. 8. M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12.
12:13, KJV). Second, as we discover how this reading is a misreading, we discover the deep, if formal agreement between Kierkegaard and Levinas. The responsible self, in each case, is tense, not relaxed and at ease in Zion (see Amos 6:1–7); and in both cases this tension derives not from a natural, self-centered conatus essendi but from a desire directed precisely toward that Other who radically relativizes that conatus, denying autonomy both to its cogito and to its will to power. They disagree most obviously on who this Other, in the first instance, is.